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THE RELEVANCE OF THE FRAMERS' INTENT
RANDY E. BARNE'IT*

Ever since the revival of interest in originalism that occurred in
the 1980s, critics have 'charged that for a variety of reasons it is
impractical, if not impossible, to determine the Framers' intentions. 1 In addition, they argue that we today should not be bound
by the intentions of a few men who lived and died over two-hundred years ago. 2 In sum, adherence to original intent is rejected
as being impractical, unjust, or both.
In this Article, I will argue that we cannot assess either the practicality or the justice of discerning original intent without first asking why it is we are consulting the intentions of the Framers. I
shall discuss two reasons to consult the Framers. The first views
the Framers as wardens; the second as designers or architects.

I.

THE FRAMERS AS WARDENS

Let me begin by posing a question: does a law enacted by Congress and signed by the President create a duty of obedience in
the people? Would it be appropriate not merely to punish, but
also to condemn a person who disobeys a law for having done
something morally wrong? To put the matter starkly, did the
Branch Davidians in Waco have a duty in conscience to submit to
the commands of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms
agents who came calling one morning? Did Randy Weaver do
something wrong, not merely illegal, when he failed to surrender
to the U.S. Marshals who approached his cabin or to the FBI
agents who then surrounded it?

*

Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of law.

I. See, e.g., RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 317-24 (1986) (describing the practical dif-

ficulties in identifying an authoritative intention of the framers oflegislation); Paul Brest,
The Misconceived Qpestfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 213-17 (1980)
(same, as applied to the Framers of the Constitution).
2. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theary of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv.
277, 357 (1985) ("The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example, our
treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands
that it does is a bad theory."); larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution,
73 CAL. L. REv. 1482, 1499-500 (1985) ("The Constitution was adopted by propertied,
white males who had no strong incentives to attend to the concerns and interests of the
impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those of us
alive today who hold conceptions of our interests and selves very different from the ones
held by those in the original clique.").
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Although most constitutional scholars do not consider these
sorts of questions explicitly, those attracted to originalism imply
that a law creates a duty of obedience if it reflects the wiii of the
people.3 In practice, this means the will of the majority of the
people. What, then, is the role of the Constitution? According to
this view, the Constitution places limits on what laws a majority
may impose on the people, but these limits are themselves a reflection of majority will; the Constitution reflects the will of the
majority who elected representatives to state constitutional conventions, a majority of whom, in turn, voted to ratify the Constitution. Because the Constitution, like a statute, is viewed as a
command from the majority, we need to determine the intentions of those who issued the command to determine its
meaning.
Of course, as many have noted, this is exceedingly difficult to
do. 4 How exactly does one determine the collective intentions of
thousands of persons who elected hundreds of representatives
who then voted to ratify the Constitution in thirteen different
assemblies-not to mention the intentions of those who voted
for thousands of state legislators who in turn voted to ratify the
various constitutional amendments at different points in our
history?
As a surrogate, we consult the statements made by various
members of the constitutional convention, supplemented perhaps by statements made by members of ratification conventions,
with the assumption that others shared these stated views. But
these arguments can get extremely complicated. Witness, for example, my debate with Professor Thomas McAffee concerning
3. Because the claim is usually implicit, it is difficult to document. One example is
Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, As Perceived fly Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1508,
1533 (1994) ("Ours, the Declaration of Independence declared, is a government that
derives its powers from the 'consent of the governed.' That consent was given by the
Ratification Conventions.").
Another writer who has made the connection between popular will and legitimacy
more explicit is Robert Bork:
It is asserted .•. that the judicial philosophy of original understanding is fatally
defective in any number of respects. If that were so, if the Constitution cannot
be law that binds judges, there would remain only one democratically legitimate
solution: judicial supremacy, the power of the courts to invalidate statutes and
executive actions in the name of the Constitution, would have to be abandoned.
For the choice would then be either rule by judges according to their own
desires or rule by the people according to theirs.
RoBERT H. BoRK, THE l'EMPnNG OF AMERICA 160 (1990).
4. See, e.g., DwoRKIN, supra note 1, at 315-23; Brest, supra note 1, at 213-17.
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the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment's protection of
the rights "retained by the people."5
Moreover, the difficulties in discerning the Framers' intentions
increase both as time elapses and as we need to get more specific.
Would the Framers have considered a wiretap to be a "search"? 6
Would they have considered flag-burning to be a form of
"speech"? 7 Would they have considered cable television to be a
form of "the press"? 8 We make these specific inquiries because
we view the Framers as wardens having issued commands, the
meaning of which depends on their intentions.
In response to these difficulties in answering very specific questions concerning the Framers' intent, proponents of originalism
employ a number of techniques. Often, in the absence of evidence, a hypothetical group of framers is consulted-as in, "The
Framers would have been shocked to learn that the First Amendment protects [fill in the blank]." 9 One may think of this as a
type of constitutional "channeling" in which originalist
clairvoyants ask: "Oh Framers, tell us what would you think about
the following law?"
To get around the problem of specificity, some originalists
adopt the presumption that, if a subject is not specifically men5. For my contribution, see Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth
Amendment, in 2 THE R.!GIITS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1993); Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: james
Madison !5 Ninth Amendment, in 1 THE RIGIITS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND
MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). For Professor McAffee's responses, see Thomas B. McAffee, The BiU of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the
Rights "Retained" l:rj the People, 16 S. ILL. U. LJ. 267 (1992); Thomas B. McAffee, The OriginalMeaningoftheNinthAmendment, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1215 (1990); Thomas B. McAffee,
Prolegomena flJ a Meaningful Debate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. CIN. L. REv.
107 (1992).
6. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .•••").
7. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law •.. abridging the freedom of
speech .•• .'').
8. Cf. U.S. CaNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
•.. of the press .••.").
9. Although this is typically done orally in speeches and lectures, for a published example of this approach to the contention that the Ninth Amendment authorizes judicial
protection of the unenumerated rights retained by the people, consider Judge Bork's
statement:
[I]t is inconceivable that men who viewed the judiciary as a relatively insignificant branch could have devised, without even discussing the matter, a system,
known nowhere else on earth, under which judges were given uncontrolled
power to override the decisions of the democratic branches by finding authority
outside the written Constitution.
BaRK, supra note 3, at 185.
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tioned in the text of the Constitution, it is said to be "silent" on
the issue and the government therefore has plenary power to do
what it wishes. 10 So because the Constitution does not mention
flag-burning or cable television-or marijuana or contraception
for that matter-it is presumed that the majority, acting through
its representatives in government, may regulate or prohibit these
activities as it pleases. Because the Constitution does not mention
wiretaps or electronic smveillance, the government is not restricted by the Fourth Amendment in using these technologies.
Thus the difficulties surrounding original intent are resolved by a
simple default rule that favors enhanced governmental power
whenever the Framers' opposition to such activity by government
cannot be divined.
Notice how this originalist method leads to what can only be
described as-well-the Leviathan: a Hobbesian result that
would have shocked the conscience of all the hypothetical Framers I have consulted on the subject. Yet many originalists seem
unembarrassed by this disconnection between the results of their
methodology and the views of limited government that were universally accepted by the founding generation.
Despite these well-known weaknesses of originalism, there is
something curious about the appeal of the Framers' intentions
that is worth stopping for a moment to consider. In my experience, persons from every political group and interpretive school
are fascinated by the intentions of the Framers. They are not,
however, particularly interested in the intentions of delegates to
state ratification conventions or the attitudes of the general population at the time of the framing.
This suggests to me that we are interested in the Framers' intentions not because they are a surrogate for the difficult-to-discern will of the majority of 1789, but because we respect their
opinions. Perhaps they are "authorities," not in the sense that a
statute is said to be authority, but in the sense that Story, Kent,
Williston, Wigmore, and Corbin are authorities. We respect their
opinions because we think they knew what they were talking
about. The weight of their expertise, knowledge, and reflection
influences us in a way that sheer mt9ority will cannot. That the
10. See, e.g., id. at 150 ("Democratic choice must be accepted by the judge where the
Constitution is silent."); id. at 259 ("[W]here the Constitution does not speak, the majority morality prevails."); id. at 345 ("[W]here the Constitution is silent, the people must
decide through legislation.").
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Framers advocated a particular idea suggests to us that it is a good
idea, not merely that it reflected the preferences of the biggest or .
strongest group.
With this in mind, let me sketch my view of the Framers as
Designers.
II.

THE FRAMERS AS DESIGNERS

Suppose that instead of viewing the Constitution as representing a command by a long-ago Illi!iority whose intentions we need
somehow to discern, we view the Constitution as the blueprint
for a machine that was designed to perform a certain function.
In this case, the machine is designed to make laws to accomplish
certain ends-laws that are supposed to be binding in conscience upon the citizenry.U
Think of the Constitution the way you might think of a
machine designed to make sausages. We want a sausage-making
machine to provide us with food, but we also want to ensure that
the sausages the machine produces are wholesome and untainted by disease. Because we do not want to have to inspect
each and every sausage to see if it is wholesome, we want a
machine whose design gives us confidence that it produces good
sausages.
Similarly, a constitution specifies the design of a mechanism to
produce laws that are beneficial but not u:r~ust; laws that, because they are both necessary and proper,I2 bind us in conscience. Yet because we cannot inspect every law individually, we
need some confidence that the internal operation of the lawmaking process is designed to produce beneficial laws and to weed
out those that violate the rights retained by the people. Only a
constitution that establishes a lawmaking process with the requisite built-in quality controls can impart legitimacy on the laws enacted in its name. 13 A constitution that fails to contain such
internal quality control procedures tells us nothing about the justice of the laws it produces. We may obey, like the Holmesian
11. I explain and defend this conception of the Constitution in Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudicatian, 12 CoNsr. CoMMENTARY 93 (1995).
12. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope ofFederal Power: A jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267 (1993) (explaining the original
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
13. See Barnett, supra note 11, at 105 ("[T]he requisite binding quality must go in
before the name 'law' goes on.").
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"bad man, "14 to avoid punishment, but not because we are
bound in conscience to do so.
By this approach, the Framers are viewed as designers or architects of the lawmaking "machine." We consult them when we
want to know how the machine is supposed to work, not because
they are a surrogate for the majority of the people who lived twohundred years ago, but because they might have special insight
into the machine that they designed-especially its internal quality-control procedures. They gave its purpose and design much
thought-perhaps more thought than we have-and we benefit
from their learning in interpreting their design.
More important, however, in designing this machine, the
Framers adhered to certain basic principles, analogous to principles of engineering. These principles are either sound or unsound. Adhering to them leads either to laws that bind in
conscience or to ones that do not. If they are sound, we must
continue to operate the machine according to these principles or
we will pay a heavy price.
Consider another analogy: by cutting the cables on a suspension bridge we risk collapsing the bridge because we are violating
the principles that the bridge designers engineered into the
structure. The designers' intentions do not bind us, but their design does. Assuming we share the designers' objectives, we cut
the cables at our peril. Similarly, by eliminating the safeguards
built into the constitutional structure by its Framers, we risk the
adverse consequences they consciously sought to avoid.
We need to learn about and adhere to the principles of the
Framers, then, not because they rule us from the grave, but because the principles they discovered and embodied in their
machine are as valid and useful today as they were then. If the
laws produced by their machine bind us, they do so because they
were produced by a machine that still adheres to the sound principles of lawmaking that the Framers devised.
Notice some of the advantages of the Framers-as-Designers way
oflooking at the Framers' intent. First, it explains why we remain
so fascinated and influenced by the views of the small group of
14. SeeOliverW. Holmes,Jr., The Path oftheLaw,lO HARv. L. REv. 457,459 (1897) ("If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares
only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as
a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in
the vaguer sanctions of conscience.").
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persons who framed-as opposed to ratified-the Constitution
(as well as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment).
Indeed, we generally confine our attention to just a handful of
the Framers, such as James Madison or James Wilson or George
Mason, as opposed to the views of other members of the convention or of the reigning mcyority of the time. We listen to them
more carefully than others because we respect their opinion, especially the opinion of the chief architect or designer, James
Madison.
Second, ~is Framers-as-Designers approach answers the question why we are bound by the decisions of a few dead white
males. The anS\ver is that we are not bound by their decisions per
se. Instead, if their principles are correct and we seek what they
sought, then we must adhere to the principles they discovered
and embodied in the Constitution. In sum, we are bound by the
correctness of their principles, not by their source, though we consult their source to discern what exactly these principles are and
to understand them better.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that scholars and activists who reject the Framers' views of limited government seek to
undermine the operation of the machine they designed to effectuate these views. By the same token, some who share the Framers' views of liberty might think them to have been mistaken in
certain of their design decisions-for example, in refusing to
abolish slavery, by failing to provide congressional term limits, or
by failing to find some means of protecting citizens from abuse
by their state governments.
Third, according to the Framers-as-Designers approach, we
consult the writings of the Framers to discern not their specific
hypothetical intentions towards particular legislation, but the
principles that they designed into the constitutional structure we
interpret. Among these principles are federalism, separation of
powers, judicial review, and freedom of speech and religion. I
would add to this frequently cited list the principle embodied in
the Tenth Amendment15-that the government of the United
States is supposed to be limited to the delegated powers-which

15. U.S. CoNsr. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").

410

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 19

undermines any interpretation of the Commerce Clause16 that
gives plenary power to Congress. And it should come as no surprise that I also would emphasize the principle embodied in the
Ninth Amendmentl7-that constitutional protection of liberty is
not limited to the few liberties that were mentioned expressly in
the constitutional text, but that this protection extends to all the
other rights retained by the people as well.
We are quite capable today of discerning the meaning and the
merit of these general principles. Perhaps, after seeing them violated for sixty years, we can even appreciate these principles better. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, the misery and
injustice created by the modern welfare state is testimony to the
wisdom of the Framers. Indeed, one indicator of the obviousness
of the Framers' principles is the convoluted theories that have
been invented to supplant them, such as the theory that the Second Amendment protection of the people's right to keep and bear
arms 18 ·was intended to protect the States' power to maintain a
militia. 19
In sum, provided we are looking for the right intentions and
for the right reasons, a commitment to original intent is not
barred by the indeterminacy of historical materials. We should
look to the Framers' intentions, not because we are bound by
their intentions as such, but because we today share their intentions to limit the power of government in a way that enhances
and protects the liberty of the people. We are "bound" to adhere
to their principles because they are as vital to protecting liberty as
the principles by which one designs a bridge are to preventing its
collapse. We ignore them at our peril.

16. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ••. To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the severnl States, and with the Indian
Tribes ••..").
17. U.S. CoNsr. amend IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
18. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security
of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,"),
19. For an example of this argument, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrru·
TIONAL LAw 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988). The extensive historical evidence to the contrary is
summarized in Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1983); see also Glenn H. Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461 (1995) (summarizing recent Second Amendment
scholarship).

